Alp SuleimanGrowth Partner

Code and agents · United Kingdom

Builder.ai

A no-code app platform valued above a billion dollars on an AI label went from default to insolvency in a month, amid allegations that most of its revenue was unpaid invoices and customers with one-dollar deposits.

Verdict: Perception level

Updated: 2026-10-06

01

Profile

What it does
A no-code app development platform with an AI product manager called "Natasha"; founded in London in 2016 as Engineer.ai [1]. Wikipedia relays, with sources, that in August 2019 the Wall Street Journal reported the company's code was written mostly by human engineers rather than AI [1].
Founded
2016, London; founder Sachin Dev Duggal [1]. In February 2025 Duggal stepped down as CEO and Manpreet Ratia took over [1].
Founders
Sachin Dev Duggal (founder, "chief wizard" title) [1]
Pricing model
Project-based app development and cloud services. The revenue definition itself is the subject of this case.
Funding
  • 2018: Series A $29.5M [1]
  • 2023: $230M round; Microsoft, Insight Partners, SoftBank, Qatar Investment Authority [1]
  • 2024 (secondary data): loan from Viola Credit; the date and amount appear only in secondary reports, not in any opened source [4]

02

Growth timeline

  1. 2016

    Founded as Engineer.ai, London

    [1]
  2. 2019-08

    Wall Street Journal: most code written by human engineers (Wikipedia relay)

    [1]
  3. 2023

    $230M round; Microsoft and QIA among investors

    [1]
  4. 2025-02-27

    Duggal steps down as CEO; Manpreet Ratia becomes CEO

    [1]
  5. 2025-05-20

    Company announces insolvency proceedings

    "will be entering into insolvency proceedings and will appoint an administrator"

    [2]
  6. 2025-07-31

    Bloomberg findings: unpaid reseller invoices and $1-deposit customers (secondary data)

    "$142 million booked from resellers who never paid"

    [3]

03

Growth loop

  1. 1AI narrative: Natasha
  2. 2Branded investors
  3. 3Revenue-linked debt
  4. 4Reported revenue
  5. 5Collected revenue
  6. Leak: the gap between invoiced and collected triggered the default

Not a growth loop but a broken one: the narrative brought investors, investors brought debt; when reported revenue did not turn into collected revenue, the debt ended the company.

The drawing shows the shape of the loop; each node is explained in the list below. The red arrow marks value leaking out of the loop.

04

Mechanism

Acquisition channels
The visible channel was corporate partnership and brand: Microsoft, Insight, SoftBank and QIA in the 2023 round [1]; Duggal on the Davos stage in January 2024 as an "AI unicorn" founder (secondary data) [3]. The proof of growth was the investor list, not customer data (opinion).
Loop
The alleged mechanism is not a growth loop but a manipulation of the revenue definition: according to Bloomberg, $142M invoiced to resellers who never paid, $107M counted from "customers" with deposits as low as $1, and revenue overstated by 300 percent (secondary data) [3]. The round-tripping allegation involving VerSe Innovation was rejected by VerSe's co-founder as "baseless and false" (secondary data) [4]. There is no court ruling; all of this is allegation.
Activation
No real usage data was ever published. The question known since the 2019 WSJ story was whether the product was AI or human labour [1].
Retention evidence
No retention evidence. With the revenue itself in dispute, the retention question is moot (opinion).
Role of pricing
Project based. In May 2025 lender Viola Credit seized most of the company's cash after the default (Mobile World Live) [4]; the figures on the revenue restatement exist only in secondary sources that could not be opened, so they are not published here.
Distribution moves
Davos, press and funding rounds; the Microsoft partnership [1][3]. A reseller network as the sales channel; the problem lay precisely in invoices from that network counted as "revenue" (secondary data) [3].
Team
About 770 employees in early 2025, about 270 let go in April (secondary data) [2]; in June 2025, 80 percent of the workforce, about 1,000 people, were laid off [1]. The two sources conflict: a staff of 770 and a layoff of 1,000 cannot both be right; both figures are given as the sources state them, and which is correct is an open question [1] [2].

05

Real reading

The five questions of the Growth Claim Check, applied to this company's public claims.

  1. 01

    What was measured, and by whom?

    yes

    Revenue was the company's own claim; according to Bloomberg, $142M of reseller sales were never collected (secondary relay) [3].

  2. 02

    Perception or outcome?

    no

    The number presented as an outcome was perception: unpaid invoices and deposit customers.

  3. 03

    Is there a stability or quality metric?

    no

    No quality or stability metric was ever published.

  4. 04

    Is there a counterfactual or cohort?

    no

    No counterfactual; the investor list stood in for evidence.

  5. 05

    Nominal or real?

    no

    Not even nominal: the gap between invoiced and collected is the case itself.

Verdict

Perception level

Perception level and beyond: alleged revenue inflation. The text must say "alleged" and "according to Bloomberg"; there is no court ruling, and the original Bloomberg and FT texts could not be opened.

Test your own claim with the same five questions: Growth Claim Check →

06

Shadow side

  • The whole case is shadow. Reports naming Amazon and Microsoft among creditors are in secondary sources; Quinn Emanuel and Shibumi Strategy appear on the creditor list (secondary data) [4].
  • Lender Viola Credit seized most of the company's cash after the default: "Viola Credit … seized most of the company's cash" (secondary data) [4].
  • The 2023 revenue restatement differs across two secondary sources, $45M in one and $140M in the other; both should be read as "secondary, conflicting" [2][5].

07

What it teaches a founder in Türkiye

This section is opinion; a reading, not a source.

  1. 01

    (opinion) Write down the revenue definition: invoiced, collected and refundable deposits are separate lines.

  2. 02

    (opinion) Reseller revenue is not revenue until it is collected; ask for a "net collections" line in the investor deck.

  3. 03

    (opinion) The "AI" label does not speed up growth, it delays scrutiny. The 2019 warning was ignored for six years.

  4. 04

    (opinion) A branded investor list is not evidence. The five questions of the Growth Claim Check apply to investors too.

  5. 05

    (opinion) When growing on debt, read the revenue covenant: the loan went into default on a revenue restatement and ended the company within a month.

A question for you: remove this company's logo and drop the loop onto your own product. Which node stays empty?

08

Sources

Numbers are the references in the text. An 'opened' source was read by the researcher; 'secondary' ones are verified against their primary source before publication.

  1. [1]
    Builder.ai (encyclopedia entry, with numbered sources)

    Wikipedia · accessed 2026-10-05 · opened

    “used human engineers rather than AI for most of its coding work”

    Note: WSJ 2019 relay

  2. [2]
    AI unicorn Builder.ai confirms insolvency proceedings

    Tech.eu (Cate Lawrence) · 2025-05-20 · opened

    “will be entering into insolvency proceedings and will appoint an administrator to manage the company's affairs”

  3. [3]
    Startup Builder.ai Goes From $1.5 Billion Unicorn to Bankruptcy (republication of the Bloomberg text)

    Securities Docket / Bloomberg · 2025-07-31 · opened

    “The London-based company booked $142 million in sales from resellers that never paid any money and claimed an additional $107 million from customers who made deposits of as little as $1.”

  4. [4]
    Builder.ai files for bankruptcy following sales scandal

    Mobile World Live (Amiya Johar) · 2025-06-06 · opened

    “baseless and false”

    Note: VerSe co-founder Umang Bedi

  5. [5]
    Builder.ai investigation uncovered 'potentially bogus' sales before collapse

    Sifted · 2025-05 · secondary

    Note: text could not be opened; the revenue-estimate restatement rests on this report, amounts not verified

09

Open questions

  • The size of the Viola Credit loan, the amounts withdrawn and left, and the restated 2024 revenue estimate were found in no opened source and were removed from the text; the Bloomberg/FT/Sifted originals must be opened.
  • Original Bloomberg and Financial Times texts; the Sifted text. The evidence auditor must open them before publication.
  • The 2023 revenue restatement: $45M or $140M; two secondary sources conflict.
  • The administrator's (Alvarez & Marsal) report; the chapter of the US Delaware filing.
  • The size of Microsoft's 2023 investment; the Wall Street Journal 2019 story itself.
  • Headcount conflict: tech.eu gives about 770 employees in early 2025, Wikipedia says about 1,000 people were laid off in June. The date of the Viola Credit loan (October 2024?) is not in any opened source.